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RETHINKING CIVIL RESISTANCE IN THE
FACE OF RIGHTWING POPULISM:
A THEORETICAL INQUIRY
JANJIRA SOMBATPOONSIRI
Abstract
This paper seeks to examine some theoretical limitations potentially undermining civil resist-
ance campaigns countering rightwing populism, and suggests how we might rethink the polit-
ics of nonviolent struggle. It argues that protests against rightwing populism have generally
tackled the ‘supply side’ of populism or populist leaders. However, little attention has been
paid to the ‘demand side’, which explains why constituents vote for populists. Increasing sup-
port for populist leaders reflects a collective perception that established political institutions
are not living up to the expectations of ordinary people. In response to rightwing populism,
civil resistance movements will need to engage two fronts of the struggle. The first is economic
inequality perpetuated by a neoliberal order against which rightwing populists claim to defend
the ‘people’. The second front entails a cultural reconstruction of the notion of the ‘people’ in
response to cultural anxiety that has given ground to populist nativist discourses. This article
proposes that both of these tasks require a conceptual reconfiguration of nonviolent resistance
regarding power and culture.
Keywords: populism, rightwing, civil resistance, neoliberalism, culture, identity
Introduction
From Donald Trump to Marine Le Pen, from Nigel Farage to Rodrigo Duterte, and
from Recep Teyyip Erdogan to Viktor Orban, ‘populists’ have increasingly attracted
global attention with a variety of explanations for the rise of rightwing populism.
While populist politics supports popular defiance of broadly defined ‘elites’, populist
leaders potentially mutate into autocrats. Owing to this tendency, various civil society
groups have increasingly relied on nonviolent methods to resist populist figures. Civil
resistance scholarship embraces these efforts to defend liberal democracy from
rightwing populism. This scholarly position not only overlooks the complex
relationship between democracy and populism, but it reflects an ideological outlook
underpinning analyses of civil resistance. Gene Sharp’s theory of power has influenced
contemporary studies of citizens’ nonviolent struggle for freedom from non-democratic
regimes. It is routinely suggested that dictatorships should be toppled. While this
theoretical compass may be useful for activism against authoritarian governments, it
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can be counterproductive in the context of contemporary rightwing populism. The rise
of rightwing populist leaders in mainstream democratic politics reflects a deeper demo-
cratic crisis. ‘Overthrowing’ populists in power, therefore, does not necessarily address
these crises, and diminishes the voices of the aggrieved electorate.
This article’s arguments are twofold. First, effective civil resistance against rightwing
populism necessitates a nuanced approach to populist politics, which addresses both its
‘demand’ and ‘supply’ sides. Second, theoretical reconfigurations of civil resistance in the
face of rightwing populism are needed. These should set the stage for engaging in the
debates concerning neoliberalism as a form of structural violence and cultural reinterpret-
ation of what defines the ‘people’. This article focuses on the unfolding development of a
rightwing populist surge in the US and Europe and civil resistance campaigns against it.
The unit of analysis is the nonviolent or civil form of protest action, which is explicated
in the civil resistance literature as the central ingredient generating broad-based mobilisa-
tion and thereby offering movements leverage over the more powerful adversaries. This
article seeks to address problematic premises of these theories and explore ways in which
they can be invigorated in the wake of rightwing populism.
What Is Populism? And What Is Its Breeding Ground in the
21st Century?
Existing academic debates suggest that populism is a vehicle for expressing popular griev-
ances of those identified as the ‘people’ against the loosely defined ‘elites’. The ‘people’
are usually portrayed as authentic, while the elites are viewed as corrupt and self-serving
(Espejo 2017; Inoescu & Gellner 1969; Kazin 1995). These rhetorical characteristics can be
incorporated into left and right spectrums of political ideology (Laclau 2005). On the left
spectrum, populism is an antidote to liberal democracy, which has increasingly imposed
an economic framework and cultural values on the ‘people’ without popular consulta-
tions. Established political systems moreover respond to demands by transnational, but
unelected, institutions, rather than constituents who call for redistribution and participa-
tion in decision-making (Mouffe 2005; 2016). However, on the right spectrum, populism
runs counter to pluralism, thereby fundamentally threatening democracy. Populist politics
are based on the demarcated boundary between ‘us’ the people and ‘them’ ‘the elites’,
and the rhetoric that the latter is the adversary of the former. Rightwing populists inject a
cultural element into this equation by additionally identifying the foreign ‘other’ as the
threat to the people. Meanwhile, domestic critics of rightwing populists are usually
depicted as traitors. This framing justifies repression of dissidents and the bypassing of
checks and balances (Inglehart & Norris 2016, 3–4; M€uller 2016). The US in the late 19th
century and Latin American countries at the dawn of the 20th century experienced the
tide of leftwing populism, while Europe suffered from rightwing populism in the after-
math of the First World War (Cammack 2000; Kazin 1995; Mudde 2007).
Regardless of whether it is left or right, populism constitutes a language of protest
against what is considered an established political order. Instead of taking to the street,
in populist protest movements the people channel their demands through a (typically
charismatic) leader. It is the populist leader that promises to deliver the people’s
wishes. Understanding political mechanisms underpinning populism requires us to
contemplate both the demand side (populist supporters) and the supply side
(populist leaders).
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Demand Side
The demand side of populism sheds light on reasons why constituents endorse a
populist leader or his/her policies and rhetoric. Existing explanations for contempor-
ary support for rightwing populism, particularly in the US and Europe, are twofold:
economic grievances and cultural backlash. These forces interact intrinsically and
potentially reinforce each other. The economic explanation focuses on the impact the
neoliberal economic framework has on inequality.
Economic explanation: neoliberalism, inequality and votes for
rightwing populists
The Western economic order after the Second World War was characterised by booming
manufacturing industrialisation, government provisions of welfare, and consequent
transformation of (especially ‘white’) working class to middle class (Piketty 2013,
153–154). The neoliberal age began during the economic downturn in the early 1980s,
which was caused by an energy price hike and intense manufacturing competition. The
latter led to overcapacity, decreasing profits for companies in the US and Europe.
Neoliberal policies were introduced to boost income growth for companies through the
deregulation of business, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and cutbacks in fiscal
expenditure on social welfare (aka austerity) (Brown 2015; Harvey 2007). The end of the
Cold War marked the inception of globalised neoliberalism married with globalised
democratisation. Industries can cut costs through the transfer of manufacturing to devel-
oping countries with lax labour laws and lower wages than in the West, or through the
import of cheap labour. Influenced by the neoliberal framework, international organisa-
tions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and lately
the European Union, have imposed policy packages focusing on privatisation and aus-
terity on countries undergoing economic recession (Simmons & Elkins 2004).
While these aspects of economic globalisation have created unprecedented growth for
many countries and a tremendous decrease in global poverty, inequality has risen (Ostry
et al. 2016). Two decades after the neoliberal experiment, people living in the most afflu-
ent country on earth typically earn 134 times more than those in the most impoverished
part of the globe (see Milanovic 2016). In addition, inequality has widened the income
gap between the richest and the rest in developed countries. For instance, in 2014, after
decades of neoliberal policies culminating in worsened unemployment rates, rising
debts, and high costs of public service, the share of wealth among the richest 1% has his-
torically increased from 29% to 49% of the US aggregate income, while that of the middle
class has shrunk from 62% to 43%. Unlike their parents who could achieve the
‘American Dream’, the millennials born in low income families have found it extremely
difficult to achieve economic mobility (Pew Research Center 2015).
Rightwing populist figures have attracted growing support, not from the poorest, but
rather from the dwindling middle class population affected by increasing inequality. A
case in point is the so-called ‘Obama-Trump voters’ (those voting for Barack Obama in
2012 and for Trump in 2016) and ‘drop-off voters’ (those voting for Obama in 2012 but
failing to cast the ballot in 2016). More than 50% of Obama-Trump voters and 43% of
the drop-off voters said that their incomes were falling behind the cost of living.
‘Rustbelt’ towns and cities such as Youngstown, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan were
footholds of Obama-Trump and drop-off voters. And these places have been affected
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by industrial decline and economic globalisation (Sargent 2017). Similarly, studies
show that inequality played a role in influencing Brexit votes among the older gener-
ation (50–64 age group and 65þ age group) who have witnessed gradual inequality
since the 1980s. They blamed the EU for it (Furedi 2017). The majority of the population
in the north and northwest of England where manufacturing industries have been
transferred overseas voted for Brexit (Dorling et al. 2016).
Cultural explanation
The cultural backlash explanation of rightwing populism originates in a liberally
inspired argument favouring cultural diversity and global citizenship. The explana-
tions concerning populism can be somewhat simplistic, linking popular votes for xeno-
phobic figures with voters’ inherent racial prejudices. These voters are sometimes
described as white (often Christian) men whose privileges ‘are being stripped away by
those they view as outside interlopers’ (Beauchamp 2016; McElwee & McDaniel 2017).
A more nuanced approach suggests that rising support for rightwing populists relates
to changing values and a lost sense of community among the younger generation who
grew up in post-industrial societies. The majority of rightwing populists’ constituents
in Europe tend to be male without college degrees. Their ‘life world’ is characterised
by strong ties with national identity within tight state boundaries, a sense of group loy-
alty, family values, and traditional gender roles. Post-industrial societies saw a rapid
change in these values (Inglehart & Norris 2016, 29–30). Moreover, open borders and
cultural globalisation brought about cosmopolitan values that cherish self-identifica-
tion transcendent of nation-state boundaries. Many youngsters tend to travel overseas,
and live in urban areas. This international exposure generally contributes to tolerance
towards cultural and gender diversity, and acceptance of migrants. Considering these
new values to be the hallmark of a progressive lifestyle, cosmopolitan populations may
accuse traditionalists as ‘deplorable’ (M€uller 2017). However, these globalist discourses
concerning diversity and political correctness create a backlash by pushing those ques-
tioning these discourses towards the right. Accordingly, the cultural grievances of
rightwing populists’ constituents focus not only on foreign threats, but on liberal advo-
cates perceived to undermine their values and police their behaviours (Haidt 2016).
Supply Side
The supply side of rightwing populism denotes the way in which political leaders as
well as their ideologues forge moral frames based on popular resentment. Rhetoric
fanned by populist leaders is characterised by three components. First, the notion of
the ‘people’ is authenticated and unified in a cultural sense. Second, the moralistic
imagination shapes the perception that the ‘people’ are neglected by their elites and
exploited by outsiders. Lastly, by claiming the homogeneity of the ‘people’, populist
leaders reinforce a social divide, pitting their popular base against critics accused of
disrespecting the people’s voice (M€uller 2016). While the rhetoric reflects populists’
inherent ideologies and beliefs (be it left or rightwing), it shows their articulated strat-
egies to seize crisis-driven opportunities. The 2008 financial crisis, the 2009–2012Euro
crisis, and the 2015 refugee crisis, for instance, provided rightwing leaders and parties
with rhetorical ammunition. By highlighting elite failure to tackle these crises, and
offering alternative solutions, populists modified their political positions to capitalise
on crises (Moffitt 2015). Owing to this strategic articulation, parties such as the
JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT
10
Alternative for Germany, France’s National Front, and Austria’s Freedom Party have
moved from the fringe to political centre-stage.
Economic and cultural grievances are at the core of populist rhetoric because these shape
electoral frustration with mainstream parties. Trump’s rhetoric and European populists’
anti-EU discourses reflect a common diagnosis that the ‘people’ have been victimised by
incumbent liberal institutions. Populist lead-
ers promise to redeem the economic sover-
eignty of their nations through trade
protectionism and tightened borders (Ross
2016). Historically, economic claims might
sound convincing for many constituents
whose experiences of economic recession propel them to mistrust the ‘establishment’.
Economic claims more or less constitute a common ground for leftwing and rightwing
populists (Badiou 2016; Hassan 2016).
Nevertheless, rightwing populist attribution of economic malaise to cultural minor-
ities differentiates them from leftwing populists. Rightwing ideologues forge the
notion of homogeneous people through the cultural demarcation of ‘us’ the majority
insider versus ‘them’ the minority outsider. This cultural boundary may be based on
race (white vs. coloured minorities), religion (Christians vs. Muslims), and atavism
(native citizens vs. refugees/migrant workers). Culturally unified people are said to
be the ‘forgotten or silent’ majority whose lost voices are rejuvenated by the populists.
Their analysis of what has gone wrong in society often conflates economic regression
with real or perceived civilisational degeneration. Minorities are accused of exploiting
native populations, introducing cultural degradation, and threatening security of local
populations. Rightwing populists have historically relied on this nexus between eco-
nomic grievances and cultural anxiety to popularise their electoral campaigns (see
van Kessel 2015, 18–28).
Civil Resistance against Rightwing Populist Leaders
Rightwing populists in the US and Europe have faced increasing waves of citizen pro-
tests. In the US, protests between 2015 and 2016 gathered relatively small numbers of
participants. However, after Trump’s electoral victory, the demonstrations attracted
several thousands to millions of protesters and were staged across the country.
Participants generally opposed Trump’s illiberal agenda and autocratic or allegedly
fascist traits. Small-scale protests such as those staged by the Antifa group (shorthand
for anti-fascists) were characterised by a mixed use of violent and nonviolent methods
(see Bray 2017). However, large-scale demonstrations with more than 1,000 partici-
pants in one event have been largely nonviolent. In civil resistance scholarship, this
correlation between the nonviolent nature of resistance and the critical mass of partic-
ipants has been underlined as the key leverage of movements over the more powerful
adversaries, who may appear to have unbeatable military prowess and resources.
This advantage is likely absent in movements prone to violent tactics (Chenoweth &
Stephan 2011, 39–41). Far from being exhaustive, the following list of actions is
included in this section because they demonstrate the nexus between nonviolent char-
acteristics and mass participation. This list covers the period between 2015 and 2017
where rightwing populist figures achieved unprecedented electoral gains, becoming
the head of government, joining the government coalition or consolidating their
Economic claims more or less constitute
a common ground for leftwing and
rightwing populists.
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position as the opposition. Against this backdrop, three patterns of civil resistance
against populist figures in the US and Europe have emerged.
The first pattern is nonviolent demonstrations staged to express collective frustration
over populist figures’ electoral gains, and to counter their illiberal attitudes and poli-
cies. In the US, Trump’s victory provoked protests in several dozens of major cities
and university campuses. Participants expressed their disagreement with the chauvin-
istic nature of the new administration, while mainly advocating identity-based justice
(e.g. gender sensitivity, racial fairness, cultural inclusion).1 One of the most peaceful
events was the Women’s March organised in January 2017 and 2018 where millions
of ordinary citizens took to the streets in Washington, DC as well as other cities and
towns across the US (Hartocollis & Alcindor 2017; Lopez 2018).2 Upon the announce-
ment of the Executive Order that would ban citizens from seven predominantly
Muslim countries from entering the US, protests took place across major cities and
airports as participants expressed solidarity with immigrants (Taylor 2017). In March
2017, thousands of supporters of the Affordable Care Act (or Obamacare) carried out
demonstrations against the Republican attempt to repeal this Act (Weigel 2017). And
in April 2017, hundreds of thousands of scientists protested against the government
cuts to the science research budget and political backsliding on climate change
(Milman 2017). Protests such as the Tax March also address potential nepotism and
lack of transparency under the Trump administration (Stein 2017).
In Europe, protests against rightwing demagogues gathered pace, especially after the
‘Brexit’ campaign and Trump’s victory. For instance, the ‘Pulse of Europe’ movement
has been organising gatherings every Sunday across towns and cities in western
Europe. Participants are encouraged to share their experiences of cross-European bor-
der stories, including those of cross-national couples (McGrane 2017). In central
Europe where rightwing figures currently dominate the political landscape, tens of
thousands of Polish, Austrians, Hungarians participated in anti-rightwing party pro-
tests (Deutsche Welle 2018; Kelly 2017; Peto 2018). Major cities such as Berlin and
London saw carnival-like protests where participants collectively danced to a techno
beat and carried out multicultural parades (Aziz & Rehman 2017; Chase 2018).
The second pattern of civil resistance entails boycott and non-cooperation. In the US,
the major focus was on boycotting retailers that sell Trump family products. Punning
on Trump’s misogynist statement leaked during his election campaign,3 the ‘Grab
Your Wallet campaign’ publicised a list of Trump’s business partners, threatening
them to drop Trump products or face mass boycott. The campaign went viral, gather-
ing 626 million of Twitter impressions (McGrath 2017). So far 22 retailers have
dropped Trump lines, including the Department Store Nordstrom which stopped sell-
ing the Ivanka Trump brand (Kramer 2017). In response to Trump’s denunciation of
immigrant workers, Mexican workers announced the ‘Day without Immigrants’
where immigrants refused to spend money or work. The purpose was to show the
government the significant contribution of immigrants to the US economy (Yan &
Williams 2017).
The third pattern of nonviolent protests were campaigns calling for impeachment of
populist figures and strengthening parliamentarian lobbying. An example of these ini-
tiatives is the US-based ‘Impeachment Project’, a broad opposition comprising civic
groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union. Their objective was to collect evi-
dence for lawsuits against Trump’s potential violation of the constitution (Gold 2017).
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Founded by formal congressional staffers and modelled on the Tea Party, the
‘Indivisible’ campaign mobilised 400,000 people to participate in at least 600 town
halls to pressure their representatives on issues such as immigration and Obamacare
repeal (Kamp 2017). These resistance efforts succeeded in putting a temporary pause
on the immigration ban and increasing pressure on Congressmen and senators as
seen in the Obamacare repeal (Alter 2017).
It is noteworthy that anti-rightwing demonstrations often occur in parallel with or even
as a rivalry with pro-rightwing demonstrations. As happened in the US, the UK,
Germany, the Czech Republic and Italy, the tit-for-tat protest tactics turned initially
peaceful protests into clashes with the police or between the two group members
(Barnell 2018; Ellyatt 2017; Johnston 2016; Strickland 2017). As a result, demeaning stereo-
types each side holds in respect of the other are reaffirmed, and polarisation deepened.
Unpacking the Theoretical Underpinnings of Civil Resistance
Although analyses on the effectiveness of these civil resistance efforts are currently
limited, emerging commentaries of civil resistance scholars tend to discern populism
as a threat to democracy, encouraging the overthrow of ‘authoritarian populists’
(Chenoweth 2017; see also Beauchamp 2017; Puddington & Roylance 2017; Shahid
2017). Approaches to nonviolence are generally classified into two ends of the spec-
trum. The principled approach denotes the endorsement of nonviolence as a way of
life that discourages one from committing any kind of physical or psychological harm
against all beings. At the other end of the spectrum, nonviolence is conceptualised as
a set of practical techniques used by grievance groups to wage an unarmed conflict
against a more powerful opponent (Weber 2003). Over the past few decades, this
‘pragmatic’ approach to nonviolence has been mainstreamed in the academic and
activist realms thanks to scientific methodology increasingly employed to conduct
research, and the globalisation of nonviolent action training academies (Schock 2013,
279–282). Theoretical underpinnings of this approach accordingly became relatively
dominant in the field, with burgeoning advocacies for democratisation.
A pioneering theorist of the pragmatic approach is Gene Sharp whose liberal bent
influences his understanding of the power of nonviolent action. Drawing on John
Locke’s social contract theory with a touch of anarchism (Sharp 1973, 28), Sharp’s con-
sent theory of power is premised on the assumption that power diffuses throughout
society, and because of this the populace
can oust a tyrant if they collectively with-
draw support from him or her. Challenge
groups are advised to analyse the sources
of power of the ruling elites, devise a stra-
tegic plan that would undercut these sour-
ces of power, and employ different methods of nonviolent action to achieve the
shifting of power from the elites to challengers. The nonviolent nature of these meth-
ods is crucial for three reasons. First, it induces mass participation in the campaigns.
As nonviolent actions are most likely low risk, they are accessible for people from
various backgrounds, age, and gender. Second, in the face of repression, when chal-
lengers practise nonviolent discipline — and do not resort to violent retaliation —
this often generates public anger and the government's excessive use of force can
‘backfire’. The challenge group tends to gain increased popular support, while
The challenge group tends to gain
increased popular support, while chipping
away at the opponent’s legitimacy.
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chipping away at the opponent’s legitimacy. Lastly, nonviolent responses to repres-
sion can lead to loyalty shifts by security forces. They may refuse to execute the
orders of their commanders, and even join forces with the protesters (Sharp 1973; see
also, Bond 1994; Chenoweth & Stephan 2011, 30–61; Erickson Nepstad 2011; Martin
2007; Schock 2015, 156–172).
Sharp’s theoretical explanations of civil resistance have been adopted and further
developed by contemporary scholars in the field who share his liberal leaning.
Civil resistance is conceptualised as a political means to achieve freedom identi-
fied as the ultimate goal of a polity. Forms of governance that obstruct the
achievement of this goal are potentially considered oppressive. To be fair,
‘freedom’ according to Sharp, is broadly defined to include not only political free-
dom, but also freedom from economic injustice (Sharp 1980, 310–311). Few schol-
arly works look into civil resistance for redistribution (Schock 2009; 2012).
However, the dominant trend in civil
resistance research prioritises the strug-
gle for political freedom identified as a
core element of liberal democracy (see,
for example, Ackerman & Duvall 2000;
Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Bartkowski
2013; Chenoweth & Stephan 2011; Karatnycky & Ackerman 2005; Stephan 2009).
This is why adversaries of movements are often portrayed as autocratic regimes
and dictators whose ruthless rule should be toppled and replaced with liberal
democracy. Particularly in the post-Cold War era, civil resistance gained political
currency when liberal democracy and the neoliberal economy emerged as the
dominant global order (Fukuyama 1992). The knowledge of civil resistance has
contributed to pro-democracy activism conducive to authoritarian breakdown in
Eastern Europe, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, Serbia, Ukraine,
Georgia, Egypt, Tunisia and many more.
However, the conceptual association of civil resistance with democratic change is at
the expense of dismissing other forms of oppression less visible than repressive dicta-
torship (Martin 1989; McGuinness 1993). This dismissal is partly strategic as a result
of issues of resources and an attempt to mainstream civil resistance in the American
context, but it is also ideological. Liberal underpinnings of civil resistance scholarship
imply that the neoliberal economic framework is not considered to be problematic
although it perpetuates structural violence (Galtung 1969). Nonetheless, this faceless
form of violence has inflicted a ‘slow death’ on billions of the world population sub-
jected to unequal access to basic human needs such as healthcare, education, and
employment. In addition, inequality contributes to socio-political instability, elite cap-
ture of political power, and subsequently democratic rollback (Acemoglu & Robinson
2006). Civil resistance scholarship’s limited analyses on grassroots movements fight-
ing against economic injustice and neoliberal policies in some ways reflect the hege-
monic nature of the neoliberal order. Hegemony organises knowledge and generates
collective perception of what is deemed relevant and irrelevant, true and untrue, and
right and wrong. It also shapes the way we think of how to make things right without
disturbing the established order (Gramsci 1971). Liberal influences in the field of civil
resistance make it hard for researchers to identify neoliberal hegemony as an oppres-
sive force basically because our core theory endorses parts of its ideology (Chabot &
Sharifi 2013a; Meckfessel 2016).
Civil resistance is conceptualised as a
political means to achieve freedom
identified as the ultimate goal of a polity.
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If neoliberal order and the consequent inequality contribute to increased frustration
among the electorates who have turned to rightwing populists, civil resistance schol-
arship has thus far failed to address this ‘demand side’.4 The ideological bias favour-
ing liberal regimes has led existing analyses to equate populism with
authoritarianism without taking into account deeper socio-economic crises propelling
segments of constituents to endorse rightwing populists. This development yields
two results counterproductive to effective civil resistance against rightwing populism.
First, civil resistance campaigns that only target populist leaders without appealing to
their popular base can paradoxically strengthen these leaders. Rightwing demagogues
claim to represent the voice of the people against elites in times of political despair.
These campaigns may reinforce a popular perception that anti-populist protests dis-
miss the ‘people’s voices’, thereby bolster-
ing the status quo. Although a large
segment of the population may not neces-
sarily endorse populist discourses as cur-
rently evident in the widespread protests
in Europe and the US, elected populists
still claim that they represent the ‘people’.
Second, by opting for illiberal policies, populists provoke protests from the liberal
segment of society, while mobilising their mass supporters to the streets. The tactic of
‘divide and rule’ creates difficulties for civil resistance campaigns designed to build
cross-group coalitions broad enough to undercut populist leaders’ pillars of support.
If the main advantage of civil resistance is this ability to generate broad-based sup-
port for the campaigns, targeting populist leaders disables this effect. It potentially
consolidates populist rhetoric against liberal elites, thereby sustaining the antagonistic
line between those embracing liberal values and those who do not.
Rethinking Civil Resistance in the Face of Rightwing Populism
In countering rightwing populism, civil resistance scholarship needs to engage in two
theoretical debates in order to address the ‘demand side’. The first debate concerns
power. The current theoretical framework is fixed on a dichotomous relationship
between the ruled and the ruler, shaping links between populism and authoritarian-
ism. Power in fact operates as complex networks of influence in political, economic,
social and cultural domains. Removing a
person in power does not imply funda-
mental social change. Through a deepen-
ing of the power concept, civil resistance
scholars and practitioners can address
problems of inequality and neoliberal eco-
nomic framework underlying the current
political system. Strategically, this facili-
tates a realignment with supporters of
populists who do not necessarily agree with their xenophobic rhetoric. This realign-
ment implies the dismissal of a generalisation that all populist voters have an
anti-progressive agenda. This can help make broad-based mobilisation more
effective despite populist divide and rule tactics. Eventually, the rethinking of
‘power’ in civil resistance campaigns needs to counter neoliberal hegemony,
while serving as a platform for discussing how to transform the current system.
This is reminiscent of the ‘constructive programme’ Gandhi advocated in his
Civil resistance campaigns that only
target populist leaders without appealing
to their popular base can paradoxically
strengthen these leaders.
Through a deepening of the power
concept, civil resistance scholars and
practitioners can address problems of
inequality and neoliberal economic
framework underlying the current
political system.
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independence campaign (Gandhi 1945), or the idea of nonviolent ‘utopian
enactment’ (Vinthagen 2015) that proposes inclusive action plans to overcome
economic injustice.
The Spanish movement-turned political party, Podemos, is a good example of this
strategic shift. The Indignados movement emerged in response to EU-imposed aus-
terity in Spain. It mobilised supporters across diverse segments of society who
shared common economic grievances. The aim was to resist neoliberal policies, and
at the same time encourage popular participation in the envisioning of a more just
and more democratic society. The Indignados movement later turned into the polit-
ical party Podemos. It advocated the curbing of neoliberal policies, stressing the
importance of redeeming the economic sovereignty of the state for the benefit of its
citizens. Presenting itself as an alternative to rightwing politics and neoliberal
forces, Podemos won third place in the 2016 election. Spain is one of a few European
countries that has so far escaped the plague of rightwing populism (Errejon &
Mouffe 2016).
The second theoretical debate civil resistance scholarship should engage concerns cul-
ture and identity. Rightwing populism has capitalised on cultural anxiety in times of
rapid cultural change. It has propagated the idea that the response to increasingly cul-
tural fluidity and a borderless world is to
homogenise race-based communities, close
borders, and build walls. Civil resistance
scholarship can address this cultural anx-
iety by suggesting how culture and emo-
tion are crucial for reconstructing a
common identity across political camps.
This does not mean that one should emulate nativist rhetoric and chauvinistic resent-
ment of rightwing populists. However, it is necessary to reclaim cultural spaces
through the reinterpretation of what it means and how it feels to belong to a nation.
Emotively, nationalism is associated with ethnic, racial, or religious solidarity, but
also fear of external threats and disgust of other identity-based groups (Brubaker
2004; Heanly 2013; Nussbaum 2015). In countering rightwing populism, civil resist-
ance scholarship needs to tackle this emotive foundation of nationalism. Research
should examine the ways in which campaigns can be designed to stimulate national
solidarity, and at the same time propose a new political framing which broadens the
racially and religiously exclusive components of the nation. Protest repertoires play
an important role in reinterpreting emotions of the nation through the use of carnival-
esque humour, music and cultural activities. The messages may emphasise the
importance of defending one’s political community, but link nationhood with confi-
dence, pride and self-esteem as a progressive nation, rather than fear and loathing of
others (Berezin 2002). Civil resistance scholarship should further explore the role
‘emotions of peace’ have on channelling a collective desire to preserve one’s own cul-
ture to constructive emotions (Hutchison & Bleiker 2008; 2015; Sombatpoonsiri 2015,
71–75). Existing scholarly debates in civil resistance will need to revisit the way in
which cultural components such as language, symbols, religious contents, and myths
can mobilise mass support for populist figures, and analyse how these cultural ele-
ments can be rearticulated so as to create progressive identities of ‘we the people’ (see
Sørensen & Vinthagen 2012). Such remodelling would possibly bridge the gap of
national divide, thereby weakening populists’ identity-based rhetoric.
It is necessary to reclaim cultural spaces
through the reinterpretation of what it
means and how it feels to belong to
a nation.
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Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the pragmatic approach to civil resistance is
insufficient in tackling the complex phenomenon of rightwing populism, owing
to underdeveloped theories and liberal bias. These have led existing analyses of
civil resistance to identify populist figures as the cause of democratic backsliding
and overlook deeper economic and cultural crises. Dealing with these setbacks
would require theoretical configurations that empower civil resistance analyses of
the hegemonic webs of neoliberalism and the current state of cultural anxiety
accounting for increased popular support for populist leaders. Such a theoretical
overhaul would shape the practical guidance civil resistance scholars can offer
challengers of rightwing populism. This practical advice includes the realignment
with the ‘economic losers’ who voted for rightwing populists, and the construc-
tion of a cultural narrative that accommodates those anxious for rapid change.
The realignment potentially undermines populists’ rhetoric that anti-populist pro-
tests stem from liberal elites, thereby mitigating the effects of polarisation.
Overcoming populist divide and rule tactics potentially makes civil resistance
campaigns more inclusive and bolsters nonviolent mobilisation across the polit-
ical spectrum.
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Endnotes
1 It should be noted that some of these events started out as peaceful and developed into van-
dalism. See CBS (2016).
2 For crowd estimate data on the Women’s March, see Pressman and Chenoweth (2018).
3 Prior to the presidential election, a video clip was leaked, containing Trump’s 2005 vulgar
comments about women which included ‘when you’re a star … you can do anything … Grab
’em by the pussy’.
4 There are, of course, commentaries about civil resistance in the age of neoliberalism (see, for
example, Lawrence 2013). But what is missing is systemically academic treatment of this topic,
which at times leads to critiques that civil resistance is ideologically compliant with neoliberal-
ism. See, for example, Chabot and Sharifi (2013b).
References
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
RETHINKING CIVIL RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF RIGHTWING POPULISM
17
Ackerman, P. & Duvall, J. 2000, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict, New
York and Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Ackerman, P. & Kruegler, C. 1994, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in
the Twentieth Century, Westport: Praeger Publishers.
Alter, C. 2017, ‘The First 100 Days of President Trump’s Critics Went Surprisingly Well’ in
Time, 29 April: http://time.com/4758394/trump-100-days-resistance/, accessed 13 July
2017.
Aziz, S. & Rehman, A. 2017, ‘Donald Trump Should Expect a Carnival of Resistance on the
Streets of London’ in New Statesman, 20 December: https://www.newstatesman.com/
world/2017/12/donald-trump-should-expect-carnival-resistance-streets-london, accessed 13
June 2018.
Badiou, A. 2016, ‘Twenty-four Notes on the Uses of the Word “People”’ in Badiou, A. et al. eds,
What Is a People?, New York: Columbia University Press: 21–31.
Barnell, O. 2018, ‘Thousands March in Rival Far-Right, Anti-Fascist Protests in Italy’ in France 24, 25
February: http://www.france24.com/en/20180224-italy-march-anti-fascist-demonstrations-
protest, accessed 13 June 2018.
Bartkowski, M.J. 2013 ed., Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggle,
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Beauchamp, Z. 2016, ‘White Riot: How Racism and Immigration Gave Us Trump, Brexit, and a
Whole New Kind of Politics’ in Vox, 19 September: https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/
12933072/far-right-white-riot-trump-brexit, accessed 8 May 2017.
Beauchamp, Z. 2017, ‘Experts on Authoritarianism Are Absolutely Terrified by the Comey
Firing’ in Vox, 11 May: https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/11/15611346/comey-trump-
russia-authoritarianism, accessed 13 July 2017.
Berezin, M. 2002, ‘Secure States: Towards a Political Sociology of Emotion’ in The Sociological
Review 50: 2: 32–52.
Bond, D. 1994, ‘Nonviolent Action and the Diffusion of Power’ in Wehr, P., Burgess, H. &
Burgess, G. eds, Justice without Violence, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 59–80.
Bray, M. 2017, Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook, New York: Melville House.
Brown, W. 2015, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, New York: Zone Books.
Brubaker, R. 2004, ‘In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism’ in
Citizenship Studies 8: 2: 115–157.
Cammack, P. 2000, ‘The Resurgence of Populism in Latin America’ in Bulletin of Latin American
Research 19: 2: 149–161.
CBS 2016, ‘Protests in Major Cities for Second Day after Trump’s Victory’, 10 November: https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/protests-rage-in-major-cities-for-second-day-after-trumps-victory/,
accessed 13 June 2018.
Chabot, S. & Sharifi, M. 2013a, ‘Nonviolence and Neoliberalism, from Gandhi to Gene Sharp’ in
Waging Nonviolence, 6 October: https://wagingnonviolence.org/experiments/nonviolence-
neolibralism-gandhi-gene-sharp/, accessed 15 June 2018.
Chabot, S. & Sharifi, M. 2013b, ‘The Violence of Nonviolence: Problematizing Nonviolent
Resistance in Iran and Egypt’ in Societies Without Borders 8: 2: 205–232.
Chase, J. 2018, ‘In Berlin 20,000 Detractors Shout Down 5,000 AfD Protesters’ in Deutsche Welle, 27
May: http://www.dw.com/en/in-berlin-20000-detractors-shout-down-5000-afd-protesters/
a-43948489, accessed 13 June 2018.
JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT
18
Chenoweth, E. 2017, ‘It May Only Take 3.5% of the Population to Topple a Dictator— with Civil
Resistance’ in The Guardian, 1 February: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2017/feb/01/worried-american-democracy-study-activist-techniques, accessed 13 July 2017.
Chenoweth, E. & Stephan, M. 2011, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict, New York: Columbia University Press.
Deutsche Welle 2018, ‘Thousands Protest Austria’s Right-Wing Government’, 13 January:
http://www.dw.com/en/thousands-protest-austrias-right-wing-government/a-42138789,
accessed 13 June 2018.
Dorling, D., Stuart, B. & Stubbs, J. 2016, ‘Brexit, Inequality and the Demographic Divide’ in
LSE Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science, 22 December: http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-inequality-and-the-demographic-divide/, accessed 13 July
2017.
Ellyatt, H. 2017, ‘Germany’s Nationalist AfD Party Lurches Further to the Right amid Protests’
in CNBC, 4 December: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/04/germanys-afd-urches-further-
to-the-right-amid-protests.html, accessed 13 June 2018.
Erickson Nepstad, S. 2011, Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Errejon, I. & Mouffe, C. 2016, Podemos: In the Name of the People, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Espejo, P.O. 2017, ‘Populism and the People’ in Theory & Event 20: 1: 92–99.
Fukuyama, F. 1992, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon Books.
Furedi, F. 2017, ‘A Liberal Defense of Populism’ in The American Interest, 20 December: https://
www.the-american-interest.com/2017/12/20/liberal-defense-populism/, accessed 26
February 2018.
Galtung, J. 1969, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ in Journal of Peace Research 6: 3: 167–191.
Gandhi, M.K. 1945, Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust.
Gold, M. 2017, ‘The Campaign to Impeach President Trump Has Begun’ in The Washington Post, 20
January: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/20/the-campaign-
to-impeach-president-trump-has-begun/?utm_term¼.90825f3d7c4f, accessed 13 July 2017.
Gramsci, A. 1971, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publishers Co.
Haidt, J. 2016, ‘When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism’ in The American Interest 12: 1, 10
July: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-
beats-globalism/, accessed 8 May 2017.
Hartocollis, A. & Alcindor, Y. 2017, ‘Women’s March Highlights as Huge Crowds Protest
Trump: “We’re Not Going Away”’ in The New York Times, 21 January: https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/womens-march.html, accessed 26 February 2018.
Harvey, D. 2007, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’ in The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 610: March: 22–44.
Hassan, O. 2016, ‘Podemos and Left Populism’ in Marxist Left Review: 11: http://marxistleftre-
view.org/index.php/no-11-summer-2016/130-podemos-and-left-populism, accessed 26
February 2018.
Heanly, J. 2013, ‘Emotions & Nationalism: A Process-Relational View’ in Demertzis, N. ed.,
Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension, London: Palgrave Macmillan:
243–263.
Hutchison, E. & Bleiker, R. 2008, ‘Emotional Reconciliation: Reconstituting Identity and
Community After Trauma’ in European Journal of Social Theory 11: 3: 385–404.
RETHINKING CIVIL RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF RIGHTWING POPULISM
19
Hutchison, E. & Bleiker, R. 2015, ‘Emotional Cultures and the Politics of Peace’ in History of
Emotion: From Medieval Europe to Contemporary Australia: https://historiesofemotion.com/
2015/09/23/emotional-cultures-and-the-politics-of-peace/, accessed 23 September 2018.
Inglehart, R.F. & Norris, P. 2016, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots
and Cultural Backlash’, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard Kennedy School: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/
getFile.aspx?Id ¼1401, accessed 5 May 2017.
Inoescu, G. & Gellner, E. eds, 1969, Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics, London:
Macmillan.
Johnston, R. 2016, ‘Anti-Refugee Rallies Take Place in Prague’ in Prague Post, 6 February: https://
www.praguepost.com/prague-news/anti-refugee-rallies-take-place-in-prague, accessed 13
June 2018.
Kamp, K. 2017, ‘The Indivisible Movement Is Fueling Resistance to Trump’ in Salon, 15
February: https://www.salon.com/2017/02/15/how-the-indivisible-movement-is-fueling-
resistance-to-trump_partner/, accessed 26 February 2018.
Karatnycky, A. & Ackerman, P. 2005, ‘How Freedom Is Won: From Civil Resistance to Durable
Democracy’ in Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
How%20Freedom%20is%20Won.pdf, accessed 7 June 2017.
Kazin, M. 1995, The Populist Persuasion: An American History, New York: Basic Books.
Kelly, L. 2017, ‘Several Thousand Poles Protest against Right-wing Ruling Party’ in Reuters, 6
May: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-protests/several-thousand-poles-
protest-against-right-wing-ruling-party-idUSKBN1820JN, accessed 13 June 2018.
Kramer, M. 2017, ‘Behind the Sprawling, Chaotic Movement to Boycott Trump’ in Waging
Nonviolence, 25 May: https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/boycott-trump-movement/,
accessed 13 July 2017.
Laclau, E. 2005, On Populist Reason, New York: Verso.
Lawrence, N.L. 2013, ‘Are Ukrainians Taking the Streets for Neoliberalism’ in Waging
Nonviolence, 6 December: https://wagingnonviolence.org/2013/12/ukrainians-taking-
streets-neoliberalism/, accessed 27 February 2018.
Lopez, G. 2018, ‘A Year after the First Women’s March, Millions Are Still Actively Protesting
Trump’ in Vox, 23 January: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/23/
16922884/womens-march-attendance, accessed 26 February 2018.
Martin, B. 1989, ‘Gene Sharp’s Theory of Power’ in Journal of Peace Research 26: 2: 213–222.
Martin, B. 2007, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
McElwee, S. & McDaniel, J. 2017, ‘Economic Anxiety Didn’t Make People Vote Trump, Racism
Did’ in The Nation, 8 May: https://www.thenation.com/article/economic-anxiety-didnt-
make-people-vote-trump-racism-did/, accessed 13 July 2017.
McGrane, S. 2017, ‘Unite, Unite Europe! A Protest in Favor of the European Union’ in The New
Yorker, 19 April: http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/unite-unite-europe-a-
protest-in-favor-of-the-european-union, accessed 14 July 2017.
McGrath, M. 2017, ‘A #GrabYourWallet Effect? Following Nordstrom Drop Ivanka Trump Line
Disappears from Neiman Marcus Website’ in Forbes, 3 February: https://www.forbes.com/
sites/maggiemcgrath/2017/02/03/a-grabyourwallet-effect-following-nordstrom-drop-ivanka-
trump-line-disappears-from-neiman-marcus-website/#12a7920d29ca, accessed 13 June 2017.
McGuinness, K. 1993, ‘Gene Sharp’s Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent’ in
Journal of Peace Research 30: 1: 105–115.
JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT
20
Meckfessel, S. 2016, Nonviolence Ain’t What It Used to be: Unarmed Insurrection and the Rhetoric of
Resistance, Chico: AK Press.
Milanovic, B. 2016, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Milman, O. 2017, ‘March for Science Puts Earth Day Focus on Global Opposition to Trump’ in
The Guardian, 22 April: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/apr/22/march-
for-science-earth-day-climate-change-trump, accessed 13 July 2017.
Moffitt, B. 2015, ‘How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in
Contemporary Populism’ in Government and Opposition 50: 2: 189–271.
Mouffe, C. 2005, The Democratic Paradox, London: Verso.
Mouffe, C. 2016, ‘The Populist Moment’ in Open Democracy, 21 November: https://www.
opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-moment, accessed 13 July
2017.
Mudde, C. 2007, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
M€uller, J.W. 2016, What Is Populism, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
M€uller, J.W. 2017, ‘A Majority of “Deplorables”?’ in Social Europe Journal 11: Spring: 20–21.
Nussbaum, M. 2015, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Ostry, J.D., Loungani, P. & Furceri, D. 2016, ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’ in Finance and
Development 53: 2: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/pdf/ostry.pdf,
accessed 13 July 2017.
Peto, S. 2018, ‘Tens of Thousands of Hungarians Protest against PM Orban’s Rule’ in Reuters, 21
April: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-protest/tens-of-thousands-of-hungar-
ians-protest-against-pm-orbans-rule-idUSKBN1HS0KN, accessed 13 June 2018.
Pew Research Center 2015, ‘The American Middle Class Is Losing Ground’: http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-losing-ground/, accessed 12
June 2018.
Piketty, T. 2013, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Pressman, J. & Chenoweth, E. 2018, ‘Crowd Estimates Jan 2018’: https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheets/d/1vl1MlIZP2i87TFvSVDUY1zkRgmSfe-_-Ae_I3pr-cQA/edit#gid ¼272855497,
accessed 26 February 2018.
Puddington, A. & Roylance, T. 2017, ‘Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy’
in Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017,
accessed 1 March 2018.
Ross, T. 2016, ‘Boris Johnson: The EU Wants a Superstate, Just as Hitler Did’ in The Telegraph,
15 May: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/14/boris-johnson-the-eu-wants-a-
superstate-just-as-hitler-did/, accessed 20 June 2017.
Sargent, G. 2017, ‘Why Did Trump Win? New Research by Democrats Offers a Worrisome
Answer’ in The Washington Post, 1 May: https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/wp/2017/05/01/why-did-trump-win-new-research-by-democrats-offers-a-worrisome-
answer/, accessed 13 July 2017.
Schock, K. 2009, ‘Defending and Reclaiming the Commons through Nonviolent Struggle’ in
Summy, R. ed., Nonviolent Alternatives for Social Change, Oxford: UNESCO: 183–201.
Schock, K. 2012, ‘Land Struggles in the Global South: Strategic Innovations in Brazil and India’
in Maney, G.M. et al. eds, Strategies for Social Change, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press: 221–244.
RETHINKING CIVIL RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF RIGHTWING POPULISM
21
Schock, K. 2013, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’ in Journal of Peace Research 50: 3:
277–290.
Schock, K. 2015, Civil Resistance Today, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Shahid, W. 2017, ‘How to Topple a Dictator’ in The Nation, 24 February: https://www.thenation.
com/article/how-to-topple-a-dictator/, accessed 15 June 2018.
Sharp, G. 1973, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.
Sharp, G. 1980, Social Power and Political Freedom, Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.
Simmons, B.A. & Elkins, Z. 2004, ‘The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the
International Political Economy’ in American Political Science Review 98: 1: 171–189.
Sombatpoonsiri, J. 2015, Humor and Nonviolent Struggle in Serbia, New York: Syracuse
University Press.
Sørensen, M.J. & Vinthagen, S. 2012, ‘Nonviolent Resistance and Culture’ in Peace & Change 37:
3: 444–470.
Stein, P. 2017, ‘The Tax March: Protesters around the Country Call on Trump to Release His
Taxes’ in The Washington Post, 15 April: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/
wp/2017/04/15/the-tax-march-thousands-protest-around-the-country-calling-on-president-
trump-to-release-his-taxes/?utm_term¼.0bcc586b3a69, accessed 13 July 2017.
Stephan, M. ed., 2009, Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the
Middle East, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Strickland, J. 2017, ‘Unite the Right: White Supremacists Rally in Virginia’ in Al Jazeera, 13
August: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/unite-white-supremacists-rally-vir-
ginia-170812142356688.html, accessed 13 June 2018.
Taylor, A. 2017, ‘A Weekend of Protest Against Trump’s Immigration Ban’ in The Atlantic, 30
January: https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/01/a-weekend-of-protest-against-
trumps-immigration-ban/514953/, accessed 13 July 2017.
Van Kessel, S. 2015, Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent?, London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Vinthagen, S. 2015, A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works, London: Zed
Books.
Weber, T. 2003, ‘Nonviolence Is Who? Gene Sharp and Gandhi’ in Peace & Change 28: 2:
250–270.
Weigel, D. 2017, ‘Democrats Rally across the Country to Save and Expand Obamacare’ in The
Washington Post, 15 January: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/
2017/01/15/democrats-rally-across-the-country-to-save-and-expand-obamacare/?utm_
term¼.537283dfdc8d, accessed 12 June 2018.
Yan, H. & Williams, D. 2017, ‘Nationwide “Day without Immigrants” Shut Down Business’ in
CNN, 17 February: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/16/us/day-without-immigrants-
vignettes/index.html, accessed 13 July 2017.
JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT
22
